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Abstract
Information theoretic secret key agreement is impossible without making initial assumptions. One type of initial
assumption is correlated random variables that are generated by using a noisy channel that connects the terminals.
Terminals use the correlated random variables and communication over a reliable public channel to arrive at a shared
secret key. Previous channel models assume that each terminal either controls one input to the channel, or receives
one output variable of the channel. In this paper, we propose a new channel model of transceivers where each terminal
simultaneously controls an input variable and observes an output variable of the (noisy) channel. We give upper and
lower bounds for the secret key capacity (i.e., highest achievable key rate) of this transceiver model, and prove the
secret key capacity under the conditions that the public communication is noninteractive and input variables of the
noisy channel are independent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key agreement (SKA) protocols are an essential component of cryptosystems. The information theoretic
treatment of the problem of two-party SKA was first considered in [1], and independently in [2]. These results
were later extended to multiterminal scenarios [3–5]. In this paper we consider the multiterminal SKA problem.
Information theoretic secure SKA is impossible without initial assumptions. A commonly used assumption is the
existence of correlated random variables at the terminals. In the channel model of SKA, a noisy channel is used
to generate the correlated variables. In the multiterminal channel model for SKA, there is a set of m terminals,
denoted by M “ t1, . . . ,mu, and the goal of the SKA protocol is to establish a shared secret key among a
designated subset A ĎM of terminals. There exists a noisy DMC (discrete memoryless channel) which will be
used for generating correlation among terminals. Terminals also can send public messages over a public, noiseless,
and authenticated channel. Each public message sent by a terminal is publicly accessible (to all terminals and the
adversary).
The adversary, Eve, has access to all the public messages, and additionally it may have access to some of the
input or output symbols of the channel by compromising a subset D ĎMzA of terminals. At the end of the SKA
protocol, terminals in A will obtain the same secret key, such that Eve has no information about it.
The key capacity of a model is defined with respect to the adversary model, and is the highest achievable secret
key rate of SKA under the specific adversary model [3, 5]. In this paper, we focus on two notions of capacity. The
secret key (SK) capacity, is the key capacity when the adversary has only access to all public messages, and the
private key (PK) capacity is the key capacity when the adversary also knows the random variables of a subset
D ĎMzA of terminals.
All existing channel models assume that a terminal either controls an input, or have access to an output symbol,
of the underlying DMC. In this paper, we introduce a new channel model that we call the “channel model of
transceivers”, in which each terminal provides input to, and receives output from, the channel. The variable
associated with a terminal j P M, is of the form Xj “ pTj , Yjq, where Tj’s are input variables and Yj’s are
output variables of the DMC. This model has the channel models of [4] and [5] as special cases.
The results of [4, 5] are not directly applicable to the channel model of transceivers because of the dual role of
each terminal; however, we prove general lower and upper bounds for the SK and PK capacities of our proposed
model using proof ideas from those works. These bounds are not tight in general, and we leave the problem of
finding tighter general bounds for future works. We also consider the transceiver model under the constraints that
input variables of the transceiver DMC are generated independently, and the public communication is noninteractive.
For this case, we prove the tightness of the above mentioned bounds and give the noninteractive SK capacity. Finally
we give simpler expressions for the SK capacity of a the special channel model which we call the Polytree-PIN.
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2Our work raises many interesting questions for future work, including finding tighter bounds for the SK and PK
capacities, and investigation of interactive protocols for achieving the key capacity of wiretapped Polytree-PINs.
A. Related Works
Different channel models differ in their specifications on how terminals control input, and access the output of
the noisy DMC, or how terminals are allowed to use the public channel. Single-input multiterminal DMC’s where
considered in the channel model of [4] where A ĎM, and all terminals are allowed to send public messages. In
the single-input multiterminal channel model of [6] however, where A “M, only a subset of terminals U ĎM
participate in the public communication while the rest of the terminals are silent (i.e., not sending public messages).
An important generalization of the model in [4] is the multiaccess channel model of [5], in which all terminals are
allowed to send public messages while a subset of terminals are supplying input to the DMC and the remaining
terminals (which is a disjoint subset from the first subset) are receiving channel outputs.
The known results on multiterminal SK and PK capacity are, SK and PK capacities in [4], and upper and lower
bounds of [6] for the single-input models. For the multiaccess channel model, the SK and PK capacities are not
known in general. Upper bounds and lower bounds on the SK and PK capacities of the multiaccess model were
given in [5], where the lower bounds are based on source emulation approach. We use this approach to derive a
lower bound for our proposed model (see Section IV-A). The SK capacity is proved for the symmetric multiaccess
channel1 with single output under the constraint that input terminals are silent [7]. It was showed that this SK
capacity is achievable by an interactive SKA protocol.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
We restrict ourselves to probability distributions over finite alphabets. We reserve upper-case letters for random
variables (RVs) and lower-case letters to denote their realizations. Upper-case calligraphic letters (e.g., M, A, etc.)
denote sets, and for any natural number m we define rms :“ t1, . . . ,mu. Let M “ rms, then XM :“ pX1, . . . , Xmq
and XA “ pXj | @j P Aq for any A Ď M. For an arbitrary real vector RM “ pR1, . . . , Rmq P Rm and for any
A Ď rms we define RA “ pRj | @j P Aq, and sumpRAq :“ řjPARj .
For a given alphabet W , let W be a random variable over W and let PW be the probability distribution of
W . We then define expectation and variance of any function fpW q as EP tfpW qu “ řwPW P pwqfpwq, and
VarP tfpW qu “ řwPW P pwqpfpwq´EP tfpwquq2. The statistical distance between two distributions PX and QX
defined over the same alphabet X is also given by
SDpP,Qq “ 1
2
ÿ
xPX
|P pxq ´Qpxq| “ 1
2
EP
"ˇˇˇˇ
1´ Q
P
ˇˇˇˇ*
.
B. The Multiterminal Source Model
The general multiterminal source model, was introduced in [3]. In this model, there is a set of m terminals denoted
by M “ rms “ t1, . . . ,mu. Each terminal j P rms has access to a random variable Xj . Let XM “ pX1, . . . , Xmq
denote the set of all variables accessible to all terminals. After n IID sampling from XM, terminals use a public
channel, that is reliable and authenticated, for a finite number of rounds. A message that is sent by terminal j is
a function of the terminal’s IID samples (observations) Xnj , local randomness, and previous public messages. We
denote by F the set of all messages sent over the public channel.
Let A Ď M be the set of terminals that want to establish a shared secret key, which need not to be fully
concealed from the helper terminals in Ac “MzA. Eve samples from the side information variable Z, which is
correlated with XM, and has full read access to public messages F. Eve is a passive adversary, that listens to the
public communication only. We denote a source model by its joint distribution PZXM , which is publicly known.
A secret key K for terminals in A is considered to be secure against Eve, if it satisfies the reliability and secrecy
conditions as defined below.
Definition 1. Consider a set of m terminals M, where A ĎM denotes the set of terminals that will share a key
K with alphabet K. Let Zn denote Eve’s side information about XnM. The key K is an p, σq-Secret Key (in short
1A two input single out put channel is called symmetric if the conditional distribution of the channel satisfies PX3|X1X2 “ PX3|X2X1 .
3p, σq-SK) for A, if there exists an SKA protocol with public communication F, and output RVs tKjujPA for each
terminal, such that
(reliability) Pr tKj “ Ku ě 1´ , @j P A, (1)
(secrecy) SD ppK,F, Znq; pU,F, Znqq ď σ, (2)
where SD denotes the statistical distance and U is the uniform probability distribution over alphabet K.
For a given source model PZXM the maximum secret key rate (p1{nq log |K|) is called the source model wiretap
secret key (WSK) capacity. If we restrict Eve’s side information to be Z “ constant, then the maximum secret key
rate is called the source model secret key (SK) capacity. If Eve’s side information is of the form Z “ XD, where
D Ď Ac is the set of compromised terminals, the maximum secret key rate is called the source model private key
(PK) capacity. Single-letter characterizations of SK and PK capacities for the general multiterminal source model
are given in [3, Theorems 1 and 2]. We review these results later in Section IV-A.
C. The Multiaccess Channel Model
The multiaccess source model, was introduced in [5]. Our work generalizes this model, that we will review below.
In the multiaccess model, there is a set of m terminals denoted by M “ rms “ t1, . . . ,mu. A subset of terminals
I “ rks “ t1, . . . , ku are called input terminals, the rest of terminals in MzI are called output terminals. There
exists a secure noisy DMC between input terminals and output terminals. Input terminals supply input symbols
Xj j P I to the DMC, and output terminals observe respective output symbols of the DMC. The underlying noisy
DMC is called a multiaccess channel and is denoted by W “ pXI , PXMzI |XI ,XMzIq, where
PXMzI |XI : X1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Xk ÞÑ Xk`1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Xm.
In the basic multiaccess model, Eve does not have any information about transmission over the DMC. Terminals
are allowed to use the underlying multiaccess DMC in n rounds, where each round of symbol transmission over the
DMC is followed by rounds of public channel discussion, and all public messages are accessible to all terminals
and Eve. The SK and PK capacities for multiaccess channel model are defined similar to the source model.
General upper bounds and lower bounds were proved in [5] for the SK and PK capacities of the multiaccess
channel model. The lower bounds are based on SKA protocols in [3] and use a technique called source emulation
that we will also use in our proofs (see Section IV-A).
In the next section, we introduce the channel model of transceivers.
III. A GENERAL CHANNEL MODEL OF TRANSCEIVERS
A. The Model
Consider a set of m terminals denoted by M “ rms :“ t1, . . . ,mu. The goal of an SKA protocol is for terminals
in M to cooperate (using the public communication) so that terminals in a subset A ĎM can establish a shared
secret key K. Terminals in Ac “MzA are called helper terminals. The key K is not required to be concealed
from the helper terminals. A terminal j P M has access to samples of a random variable (RV) denoted by Xj .
The variables of terminals are correlated. Let XM “ pX1, . . . , Xmq denote the set of these variables. All terminals
have access to a public, reliable, and authenticated channel. A public message sent by a terminal j will be received
by all terminals and everyone else, including the passive adversary Eve, who will not interfere with the public
communication. Eve may also have access to side information Z which is correlated with XM.
There exists an underlying DMC (discrete memoryless channel) which will be used for generating the correlation
in XM. For each transmission over the channel, all terminals provide input to the noisy channel and receive output
from it; i.e., we assume a set of “transceivers”. Each terminal j has two RVs, Tj which is an input variable
to the DMC, and Yj which is an output variable of the DMC, and so the RV associated with each terminal j
is given by Xj “ pTj , Yjq, where Xj “ Tj ˆ Yj . The underlying multi-input multi-output DMC is denoted by
W “ pTM, PZYM|TM ,YM ˆ Zq, where
PZYM|TM : T1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Tm ÞÑ Y1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Ym ˆ Z (3)
is the transition matrix defined over the finite input alphabet T1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆTm and finite output alphabet Y1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆYmˆZ .
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Fig. 1. (a) The multiaccess channel model of Ref. [5] where PXrmszrks|Xrks is the probability transition matrix of DMC W . (b) Our proposed
general channel model, where PYrms|Trms denotes the transition matrix and for each transceiver terminal j; we have Xj “ pTj , Yjq. Eve’s
side information is assumed to be Z “ constant for both examples here.
An SKA protocol consists of n rounds, where each round consists of one invocation of the noisy channel,
followed by public communication by terminals in M over the public channel. Let Ft denote the random variable
representing all public messages of the m terminals in round 1 ď t ď n, and let F “ pF1, . . . ,Fnq denote the
entire public communication during the SKA protocol. Each public message of terminal j in round 1 ď t ď n is a
function of all previous samples Xj1, Xj2, . . . , Xjt, its local randomness, public messages of the previous rounds
(F1,F2, . . . ,Ft´1), and previous public message sent in round t. Importantly, terminals have control over Tj’s
(input symbols) and can choose them depending on previous input symbols and the previous public messages that
are transferred in each previous round of the SKA protocol. More specifically, each input symbol Tjt of round
t ě 2 may depend on previous public discussions F1,F2, . . . ,Ft´1, and previous samples Xj1, Xj2, . . . , Xjpt´1q.
Eve has access to all public messages, F, and side information Zn.
Remark 1 (Relation with multiaccess channel model). We note that the multiaccess channel model of [5] is a
special case of the channel model of transceivers by taking Z “ constant, Xj “ Tj @j P rks “ t1, . . . , ku, and
Xj “ Yj @j P rmszrks. See Figure 1 for a pictorial comparison between the channel model of transceivers, and
the multiaccess channel model of [5]. The channel model of [4] is a special case of the multiaccess model of [5]
for k “ 1, and so a special case of our proposed model.
B. A Unified Definition of Key Capacity
Noninteractive public communication. The use of public communication in channel model is called “noninterac-
tive” [5] if during the SKA protocol, terminals each send a single message over the public channel, and this public
communication is after all symbol transmissions over the DMC. In this case, F “ Fn “ pF1, . . . , Fmq, where Fj
denotes the public message of terminal j which is only a function of Xnj .
Definition 2 (Key Capacity). Consider multiterminal SKA for a subset A Ď M. Let Zn denote Eve’s side
information about XnM. For a given (source or channel) model Q, where Q is either the IID source distribution
PZXM or the conditional distribution of the underlying DMC, a real number R ě 0 is an achievable SK rate if there
exists an SKA protocol that for every n establishes an pn, σnq´SK K P K where limnÑ8 n “ limnÑ8 σn “ 0,
and limnÑ8 1n log |K| “ R. The supremum of all achievable SK rates is called the key capacity of given model Q.
SK, PK, and WSK Capacities. In all cases, the adversary (Eve) has access to all public messages, denoted by F.
In addition to F, Eve might have side information about XnM. When the adversary has no side information about
XnM, then Z
n “ constant (i.e., independent of XnM), and the capacity is called SK capacity and is denoted by
CASKpQq. The adversary may compromise a subset of terminals D Ă Ac, in which case Eve’s side infromation is
of the form Zn “ XnD “ pXnj | @j P Dq. The compromised terminals are cooperative in the SKA protocol (e.g.,
5they can be required by the SKA protocol to reveal XnD to other terminals.) The capacity for this case is called PK
capacity and is denoted by CA|DPK pQq. In the most general sense, if Eve has access to side information Zn, which
is correlated with XnM, the key capacity is called WSK (wiretap secret key) capacity and is denoted by C
A
WSKpQq.
Note that these key capacity definitions refer to a source model capacity if Q is a joint distribution, and to a channel
model capacity, if Q is a conditional distribution.
IV. GENERAL LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS
In this section, we give general lower and upper bounds for the SK and PK capacities of the channel model
of transceivers. Later, in Section V, we give a tightness condition under which these lower and upper bounds are
matching.
A. Lower Bound
Before stating our main lower bound result we recall the single-letter characterization of the general source model
PK capacity as given in [3].
Theorem 1 (PK Capacity [3]). In a given source model XM described by PXM , for sharing a secret key among
terminals in A ĹM, with compromised terminals D Ď Ac, the PK capacity is
C
A|D
PK pPXMq “ HpPXM |PXD q ´RA|DCO pPXMq, (4)
where RA|DCO pPXMq “ min
RDcPRCO
sumpRDcq and RCO “ tRDc |sumpRBq ě HpPXM |PXBc q, @B Ă Dc,A Ę Bu .
Equation (4) implies the SK capacity when D “ H. The achievability result is based on a protocol in which
first, the compromised terminals (that are assumed to be cooperative) reveal their observed random variables, and
then the rest of the terminals in Dc communicate over the public channel to attain omniscience (i.e., the state that
terminals in Dc learn each other’s initial observations). Finally, terminals in A extract the key from the common
shared randomness XnM. It was also showed that the public communication required to obtain this PK capacity can
be noninteractive, meaning that F “ Fn “ pF1, . . . , Fmq, where Fj “ Xnj for all j P D and Fj “ fpXnD, Xnj q for
all j P Dc. See the achievablity part of the proof of Theorem 2, in Section IV of [3].
We next review the source emulation approach of [4, 5]. Consider the multiaccess channel model (see Section
II-C). The simple source emulation, introduced in [4], works as follows. For a known IID input distribution PXI ,
each input terminal j P I samples IID symbols Xnj and transmits their symbols through the DMC. During these n
symbol transmissions, terminals do not engage in public discussion. After the symbol transmissions, all terminals
have n IID samples according to the IID distribution given by PXM “ PXIPXMzI |XI . This way, in effect, a source
model with a known IID distribution is realized (or emulated) among terminals of M. Thus, after the symbol
transmission steps, any suitable source model SKA protocol can be utilized for key generation.
The source emulation technique is proved [4] to be capacity achieving for single-input multiple-out channels– i.e.,
when k “ 1 and I “ t1u. However, in general, using public discussion during symbol transmission can potentially
result in more powerful and tighter lower bounds for the multiaccess channel model. This was proved in affirmative
for some special multiaccess channels in [7, Theorem 4].
We use the general source emulation approach and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a channel model of m transceivers PYM|TM , with M “ rms, and for any publicly known random
variable V satisfying PV,TM “ PV ΠjPMPTj |V , we have
CASKpPYM|TMq ě CA|t0uPK pPV TMPYM|TMq,
and
C
A|D
PK pPYM|TMq ě CA|D
1
PK pPV TMPYM|TMq,
where CA|D
1
PK pPV TMPYM|TMq denotes the emulated source model PK capacity of an auxiliary model with m ` 1
terminals, defined over M1 “ t0, 1, . . . ,mu, where D1 “ D Y t0u, X0 “ V , Xj “ Xj @j ‰ 0, and an underlying
source distribution PXM1 “ PV pΠjPMPTj |V qPYM|TM .
Proof: We show that for a transceiver channel model for terminal set M, one can construct a source model
for terminal set M1 “ t0u YM, and use source model protocols of [3] in the latter model to obtain a channel
6model SKA protocol in the transceiver model. This leads to a lower bound on the PK capacity of the transceiver
model. The case of SK capacity is implied from the argument with D “ H.
For a given transceiver channel model PYM|TM for terminal set M define an associated source model PXM1
defined over M1 “ t0u YM, where t0u is a new terminal added to the terminal set. Let V denote the random
variable of terminal 0. The distribution of this source model is given by PXM1 “ PV pΠjPMPTj |V qPYM|TM , where
PV and PTj |V are arbitrary distributions that together generate a distribution on the input symbols of the transceivers
channel. Thus the distribution of PTM can be viewed as obtained from symbol transmission over a single-input
multi-output channel, where V is the input symbol, and TM denotes output symbols. See Figure 2 (a). Note that Tj’s
are assumed conditionally independent given V , that is PTM|V “ ΠjPTj |V . Terminal 0 is assumed compromised,
hence D1 “ t0u YD.
Let K be a secret key generated for terminals in A by the noninteractive protocol Π that was outlined in the
discussion after Theorem 1, and achieves the source model PK capacity CA|D
1
PK pPXM1 q. In Π, the public message of
terminal j is a function of Tnj and Y
n
j . The key K is a function of X
n
M1 and F. The protocol Π defines a protocol
Π1 for the transceivers model, using the following steps. First, we emulate (realize) the source model PXM1 . Note
that PV TM is known. Let v
n “ pv1, . . . , vnq be a realization of V n, accessible to all terminals and publicly known.
Each input symbol Tnj is generated independently (given v
n) according to PpTjqt “ PTj |V“vt for all t P rns. In
n consecutive rounds, terminals use the DMC PYM|TM , without using the public communication channel. Thus,
after symbol transmission, source model PXnM1 is emulated for terminals in M. That is each terminal j has access
to IID random variables Tnj and Y
n
j distributed according to the source distribution PXnM1 . Now, terminals in M
can run the source model SKA Π. Compromised terminals send their samples XnD over the public channel. The
samples of terminal 0 is also accessible to the rest of the terminals. Messages of terminals in MzD1 are generated
according to Π. Then, all terminals in A can agree on the common randomness XM1 , and extract their secret key.
Thus, at the end of Π1 the same key K of Π will be established for A, and Π1 provides a lower bound on the PK
capacity of the transceiver channel model. The key rate of Π1 is the same as the key rate of Π which can be as
large as CA|D
1
PK pPXM1 q.
B. Upper Bound
We demonstrate a new relation between the proposed channel model of transceivers and the multiaccess channel
model of [5] to prove an upper bound on the SK and PK capacities of any given channel model of transceivers.
For a transceiver channel model we define an auxiliary (related) multiaccess channel model, which is explicitly
defined in the following (also see Figure 2 (b)). Consider a given general channel model of transceivers W defined
by PYM|TM . Given PYM|TM over terminal set M, define an auxiliary multiaccess channel model W over 2m
terminals denoted by M. Let M1 “ tm`1, . . . , 2mu be the set of new input terminals. Let M be the set of output
terminal of W and thus, M “ t1, . . . ,m,m ` 1, . . . 2mu “M1 YM. Input terminals have the special property
that Xj “ Tj´m @j P M1 “ tm ` 1, . . . , 2mu, and output terminals are defined as per the given transceivers
model, i.e., Xj “ pTj , Yjq @j PM “ t1, . . . ,mu. The multiaccess channel model W can be viewed as a two-layer
DMC where the first layer is a DMC with input RVs Xm`1, . . . , X2m, and output RVs X1, . . . , Xm such that
PTM|XM1 “ ΠjPMPTj |Xj`m and PTj |Xj`m “ 1pTj “ Xj`mq is an identity (noiseless) channel for all j PM. The
DMC of the second layer is given by PYM|TM .
Theorem 3. The channel model SK capacity and the channel model PK capacity of PYM|TM for any D ĂM “ rms,
and A Ď Dc are upper bounded by
CASKpPYM|TMq ď CASKpPTM|XM1PYM|TMq, (5)
and
C
A|D
PK pPYM|TMq ď CA|DPK pPTM|XM1PYM|TMq, (6)
where the right hand side of the above inequalities are the SK and PK capacities of the auxiliary model W .
Proof: We show that the PK capacity of W gives an achievable lower bound for W . Let K P K be a private
key established for W by SKA protocol Π such that log |K| ď nCA|DPK pPYM|TMq. We use Π to generate a key
K 1 P K in W . First note that in the auxiliary multiaccess channel model of W , after each symbol transmission
each terminal j PM has access to the same variable(s) of the input terminal j `m PM1. Therefore, terminals of
71⊗m
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Fig. 2. (a) The auxiliary source model PXM1 used in the lower bound of Theorem 2. (b) The auxiliary multiaccess channel model W used
in the upper bound of Theorem 3.
M1 can always remain silent (not sending public messages), and all public messages can be generated by terminals
in M, the output terminals of W . Thus, helper terminals of M1 are dummy terminals, and their presence can
only help with the key generation. Let Π be such that in each round t ď n, terminals generate and send input
symbols Tjt “ T˜jt’s to W and receive corresponding output symbols Yjt “ Y˜jt. Then terminals engage in a public
discussion F˜
t
. Let Π1 be the protocol for SKA in W which works as follows. In each round t, input terminals
j `m P M1 generate and send input symbols Xpj`mqt “ T˜jt’s to W . Note that for every terminal j P M, we
have Tjt “ T˜jt and Yjt “ Y˜jt. Then, input terminals j`m PM1 remain silent and output terminals of multiaccess
channel W in M invoke public discussion Ft “ F˜t. Following the same instructions of Π, at the end of round n,
terminals in M can agree on a secret key K 1 P K. As, in effect, Π and Π1 are identical protocols from the view
point of M, K 1 is equal to K. Therefore, p1{nq log |K| is also an achievable key rate for the multiaccess model of
W . The maximum rate of such key is given by the PK capacity of W . The argument for SK capacity is the same
with D “ H.
Theorem 3 implies that an upper bound for the SK (or PK) capacity of W , including the upper bounds of [5,
Theorem 6], is an upper bound for CASKpPYM|TMq (or CA|DPK pPYM|TMq).
V. THE NONINTERACTIVE SK CAPACITY
We consider the following special case of the transceiver channel model (defined in Section III-A).
(a) Noninteractive SKA. The public communication F is noninteractive. This means that F only occurs after n
rounds of symbol transmission and each terminal sends one public message. Thus, XnM is not a function of F.
(b) Independent Inputs. Terminals are locally controlling their input variables, and the input variables are
independent, i.e., PTM “ ΠjPMPTj .
Key agreement protocols with such properties are desirable in practice as they use less resources and are easier
to realize.
Let CANI´SKpPYM|TMq denote the largest achievable key rate of all noninteractive SKAs that satisfy conditions
(a) and (b), above. The noninteractive SK capacity has been extensively studied in the two-party model; see for
example [2, 8, 9].
Theorem 4. For a channel model of transceivers, and a subset A ĎM, the noninteractive SK capacity is given
by
CANI´SKpPYM|TMq “ max
PTM
CASKpPTMPYM|TMq. (7)
Proof: First, we prove that the right hand side of the above equation is an upper bound on the noninteractive
capacity. Consider an auxiliary multiaccess channel W with 2m terminals denoted by M “ t1, . . . ,m,m `
81, . . . 2mu, where Xj “ pTj , Yjq @j P M “ t1, . . . ,mu, are output variables of the multiaccess DMC and
Xj @j P M1 “ tm ` 1, . . . , 2mu are input variables of DMC, satisfying PTM|XM1 “ ΠjPrmsPTj |Xj`m and
PTj |Xj`m “ 1pTj “ Xj`mq. By Theorem 3, we have
CANI´SKpPYM|TMq ď CANI´SKpPTM|XM1PYM|TMq,
and thus any upper bound on the noninteractive SK capacity of multiaccess model W is also an upper bound on the
noninteractive SK capacity of the transceiver model W . An upper bound is given for the SK capacity of any general
multiaccess channel model in [5]. Before using the proof of that upper bound we define the following notations.
For a subset A ĂM, let ΓpAq be the family of all nonempty sets B ĂM such that,
A Ę B, @B P ΓpAq,
and let ΛpAq be the set of all |ΓpAq|-dimensional vectors λ “ tλB : B P ΓpAqu that satisfy the following two
conditions:
0 ď λB ď 1, @λ P ΛpAq,ÿ
BPΓpAq : jPB
λB “ 1, @j P Dc and @λ.
According to the proof of Theorem 6, Eq. (28), in [5], for the multiaccess channel W , where M1 is the set of
input terminals (transmitters), M is the set of output terminals (receivers), and D “ H, for any λ, any achievable
key K satisfies
1
n
log |K| ď αn
n
En ` βn, (8)
where αn Ñ 1 and βn Ñ 0, as nÑ8; and
En “
nÿ
t“1
“`
HpXMtq ´
ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXBt|XBctq
˘
´ `HpXM1tq ´ ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXpBXM1qt|XpBcXM1qtq
˘‰
.
Note that under n Ñ 8 the right hand side of (8) gives an upper bound on the SK capacity of the auxiliary
multiaccess model W which, because of Theorem 3, implies an upper bound on the SK capacity of W . Now we
use assumptions (a) and (b) to simplify the expression of En in (8). Due to noninteractivity assumption (a), we
have
En “
`
HpXnMq ´
ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXnB |XnBcq
˘
´ `HpXnM1q ´ ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXnBXM1 |XnBcXM1q
˘
.
By the independence of the inputs assumption (b), and properties of λ vectors, we have HpXM1q “ řjPM1 HpXjq
and
En “ n
`
HpXMq ´
ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXB|XBcq
˘
.
By Theorem 3.1 of [4] we know that for Q “ PTMPYM|TM
CASKpQq “ min
λPΛpAq
HpXMq ´
ÿ
BPΓpAq
λBHpXB|XBcq,
which completes the proof of the converse. Also note that, a simple noninteractive source emulation method of
Theorem 2 with V “ constant achieves this capacity.
9A. The case of Polytree-PIN
In the following, we narrow our focus on a channel model of transceivers that can be described by a Polytree,
that is defined as follows. Assume that G “ pM, Eq is a directed graph, where M is the set of vertexes and E is
the set of directed edges. Each vertex (node) represents a terminal in the SKA model. Let UDpGq Ñ G1 “ pM, E 1q
is a mapping that for a given directed graph G gives an undirected graph G1 over the same nodes M such that if
in G, nodes i and j are connected by a directed edge eij P E , nodes i and j are also connected by an undirected
edge eij P E 1 in G1. For any directed graph G, UDpGq is called the the underlying undirected graph of G. We call
G a polytree, if its underlying undirected graph is a tree (has no cycles) and say a channel model is a polytree-PIN
model if, Ti “ pTij | j PMztiuq, Yi “ pYij | j PMztiuq, and
PYM|TM “
ź
eijPE
PYij |Tji ,
where eij denotes a directed edge of the polytree G. The Polytree-PIN model is basically the channel model
counterpart of Tree-PIN model of [10], that is a special class of pairwise independent network (PIN) source models
[11, 12]. PIN models are of special interest because they model correlations that are generated through the application
of wireless communication networks.
Corollary 4.1. For any given Polytree-PIN defined by G “ pM, Eq and probability distribution PYM|TM , the
noninteractive channel model SK capacity is given by
CANI´SKpPYM|TMq “ max
PTM
min
i,jPM
s.t. eijPE
IpTij ;Yjiq.
The proof is due to Theorem 4, and the fact that the source model PTMPYM|TM is a Tree-PIN for which the
SK capacity is equal to mini,j IpTij ;Yijq (See [13] Theorem 2, and Eq.(36) of [3].)
B. The case of wiretapped Polytree-PIN
In practice, there are many cases where the adversary is powerful and is capable of wiretapping. The first
information theoretical treatment of a two-party wiretapping scenario was considered for secure message transfer by
Wyner in [14]. In the context of key agreement also it is always desirable to consider scenarios where the adversary
has access to some wiretapped side information. Some wiretapped models for SKA and their corresponding wiretap
secret key (WSK) capacities were studied in [1, 2, 4]; however, these models are limited in comparison to the
general models considers for SK and PK capacities.
Unfortunately, the WSK capacity of the general source model as defined previously, even for the special case
of two terminals (|M| “ 2) remains an open problem. For the case of two-party SKA, the source model WSK
capacity is upper bounded by IpX1;X2|Zq, which is proved to be a tight bound under the additional assumption
that the Markov Chain X1 ´X2 ´ Z holds [1, 2]. In the case of |M| ě 3, PK capacities (e.g., Theorem 1) lead
to an upper bound for the WSK capacity.
Lemma 5. For a given general wiretapped (source or channel) model Q, let CA|tm`1uPK pQ1q be the PK capacity of
a model with m` 1 terminals such that Xj “ Xj for all j ď m, and Xm`1 “ Z, where only terminal m` 1 is
compromised (i.e., D “ tm` 1u). By definition of the PK capacity we have CAWSKpQq ď CA|tm`1uPK pQ1q.
Proof: Knowledge of Zn by terminals in A can only be used to help with secret key extraction (privacy
amplification). Any achievable p, σq´SK for model Q is also an achievable p, σq´SK for model Q1, thus the
WSK capacity of Q is a lower bound to the PK capacity of Q1.
We call a model, wiretapped polytree-PIN, if it is a polytree-PIN channel model with G “ pM, Eq and for any
eij P E the Markov relation Tij ´ Yji ´ Zij holds, where Z “ pZij |i, j PM, s.t. eij P Eq is the wiretapper side
information.
Theorem 6. The channel model WSK capacity of any given wiretapped polytree-PIN is lower bounded by
CAWSKpPZYM|TMq ě max
PTM
CAWSKpPTMPZYM|TMq
“ max
PTM
min
i,jPM
s.t. eijPE
IpTij ;Yji|Zijq. (9)
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Proof: For any given PTM , any secret key K achieving the wiretap secret key (WSK) capacity of the source
model described by PTMPZYM|TM is also a wiretap secret key for the wiretapped channel model of PZYM|TM .
The source model WSK capacity is given in [13] Theorem 2. Thus, for any PTM , the emulated source model WSK
capacity is lower bound to the channel model WSK capacity of PZYM|TM . A maximization over PTM gives the
best of such lower bounds.
Theorem 7. The channel model WSK capacity of any given wiretapped polytree-PIN for any A ĎM “ rms, is
upper bounded by
CAWSKpPZYM|TMq ď CA|t2m`1uPK pPTM|XM1PZYM|TMq (10)
where the right hand side of the above inequality is the PK capacity of W , an auxiliary multiaccess channel model
with 2m`1 terminals M “ t1, . . . ,m,m`1, . . . 2m, 2m`1u, where D “ t2m`1u is the compromised terminal
(i.e., XD “ X2m`1 “ Z), Xj “ pTj , Yjq @j P M “ t1, . . . ,mu, Xj “ Tj @j P M1 “ tm ` 1, . . . , 2mu, and
W is a degraded multiaccess channel with input RVs Xm`1, . . . , X2m, and output RVs X1, . . . , Xm, Z such that
PTM|XM1 “ ΠjPMPTj |Xj`m and PTj |Xj`m “ 1pTj “ Xj`mq.
The proof is in the same lines as for the proof of Theorem 3. Any upper bound to the aforementioned multiaccess
channel model W is therefore also an upper bound for CAWSKpPZYM|TMq.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced a new general channel model for multiterminal secret key agreement. Channel models of [4] and
[5] are shown to be the special cases of our proposed model of transceivers. We gave lower bounds and upper bounds
for the SK and PK capacities of the transceivers model. Then, we studied the problem of noninteractive secret key
agreement and gave the noninteractive SK capacity of the transceivers model. We gave a simpler expression for
calculating the noninteractive SK capacity of Polytree-PIN as an example. Finding tighter bounds for the SK and
PK capacity of the general case and investigating interactive protocols for obtaining tighter bounds for the case
wiretapped Polytree-PIN are interesting research directions we leave for future work.
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